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CEO age, compensation contracts and risk-taking 
 
Tuan Anh Nguyen 
 
Empirical evidence has found a consistent association between younger CEOs and a 
higher level of risk in their corporate policies. This is inconsistent with career concerns 
theory, which suggests younger CEO does not want to damage their future career 
prospect with failed risky decisions. Empirical evidence suggests that Duration (of 
compensation contract) along with overconfidence and tenure do not cause the negative 
relation between CEO Age and risk tolerance (which is measured by stock returns 
volatility and R&D intensity). On the contrary, I find older CEOs (more than 50 years old) 
respond negatively and significantly to increases in Duration when younger CEOs do not. 
More broadly, longer-duration compensation contracts make CEOs more hesitant to take 
risks and this type of contracts are given significantly more to younger CEOs. This suggests 
boards of directors may be giving CEOs suitable compensation contracts to control the 
risk tolerance of these managers. In addition, there is no difference in the magnitude of 
the impact of Duration on riskiness measures in first time CEO compared to CEOs who 
held the position before. Similarly, there is no evidence that suggests Duration has an 
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CEO age, compensation contracts and risk-taking 
 
1. Introduction 
In the day-to-day running of a business, a CEO constantly makes decisions for the firm 
that can affect her future prospects. If the firm performs well, the talent of the CEO will 
be appreciated and vice versa. Being the well - informed decision makers, CEOs are usually 
aware of the development in the market that would subsequently affect their decisions. 
This is the argument of career concerns theory, which was initially discussed by Fama 
(1980) and Holmstrom (1999). The theory predicts that young CEOs with a long career 
ahead of them would theoretically prefer to take less risk so as not to damage their future 
prospect. On the other hand, older CEOs would prefer more risk as they can prioritize 
gains with a now shorten career. Holmstrom (1999), Dechow and Sloan (1991), Gibbon 
and Murphy (1992), Graham et al. (2005) and numerous studies provide theoretical 
models and empirical evidence to support the theory and its effects on decision making 
of CEOs. 
However, recent empirical evidence finds contrary to the tried and true career 
concerns arguments, specifically risk-taking activities in businesses. Serfling (2014) find a 
negative relation between the age of CEO (CEO Age) and stock returns volatility and risky 
investments. Furthermore, Yim (2013) shows that young CEOs are more likely to engage 
in a Merger and Acquisition (M&A) transaction, and there is a boost in the compensation 
of the CEO when the M&A deal succeed. These evidences are inconsistent with career 
concerns theory, which predicts that a young CEO would prefer less risk in her decision so 
as not potentially damage her future prospect. There are a number of reasons that can 
lead to this discrepancy.  
Younger CEOs may be trying to prove themselves or to find further success. 
Prendergast and Stole (1996) show that CEO can exaggerate the importance of their own 
information to look talented when the information pays off. Young CEOs have more to 
2 
 
gain from their longer remaining career and therefore would be more willing to risk 
failures.  
Young CEOs may also be overconfident in their ability to increase their edge in risky 
situations. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) confirm the existence of overconfidence in 
CEOs. I use a proxy for overconfidence suggested by these authors which is the proportion 
of outstanding unexercised exercisable options they have in their compensation portfolio. 
There is not definitive proof that younger CEOs are more overconfident. The evidence has 
been mixed. Some psychological researches find younger subjects to be more 
overconfident (Kovalchik et al., 2005; Forbes, 2005) while others find older subjects to be 
more overconfident (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Billett and Qian, 2008). This paper 
hopes to provide some additional useful insights into the impact of overconfidence in 
young versus older CEO on corporate decision making.  
Young CEOs may be paid to take more risk. Previous research (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990) has documented the effect of the compensation contract on decision making of 
CEOs, especially the effect of equity compensation (restricted stocks grants, stock 
options, etc). Equity compensation can change the exposure of the private wealth of CEOs 
to the stock price of the firm and through that affect the risk portfolio of the executives. 
It is also possible that with similar compensation contract, young CEOs are interpreting 
differently from their older counterparts. There are many possibilities of dynamics 
between CEO Age and compensation contracts and this paper will explore some of these 
interaction effects. 
Although stocks and options have been an important component of compensation 
contracts for decades, we only just recently have the reliable data to test their effect on 
decision making. On December 12th, 2004 the Financial Accounting Standard Boards 
(FASB) issued the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123-R, which requires fair value 
assessment and record of employee stock options. All options granted after June 2005 
and unvested options granted after 1994 are required to have valuations in financial 
reports. This means that firms with large amounts of unvested options granted to 
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employees face significant accounting cost to comply with the new accounting standard. 
However, to avoid the cost, the FASB allows firms to accelerate their options to vest 
before the effective date of FAS 123-R. The new standard allows a new source of data on 
an unexplored dimension of compensation contracts of CEOs for academics and opens 
new lines of research into the effects of compensation on decision making of CEOs.      
With the data on equity compensation, I construct the duration of compensation 
contracts for S&P 1500 CEOs or the variable Duration. Duration represents the average 
years to vesting of equity compensations of S&P 1500 CEOs. For example, a Duration of 
10 represents a much longer time to vesting and a much longer horizon than a Duration 
of 1 or 2. I then test whether the horizon set by compensation contracts would influence 
the risk-taking activities in firms, through the medium of CEO decisions. 
In order to perform empirical tests, I assemble a data set of S&P 1500 firms for the 
years from 2013 to 2016. The final sample consists of 5207 CEO – year observations. To 
explain the effect of the compensation contract and CEO Age on risk tolerance of CEOs, I 
run OLS regressions of riskiness measures of the firm on compensation duration 
(Duration), CEO Age (Age), and control variables. The dependent variables or riskiness 
measures are Stock returns volatility, R&D intensity and capital expenditure (CAPEX). 
I find that Duration and Age both have negative and significant relations to the overall 
firm risk as well as R&D expenditure (which is the proxy for risky investments). The result 
suggests that longer-duration contracts and older CEOs are associated with a lower level 
of risk in stock price and investment activities of the firm. On the other hands, by dividing 
the sample into groups and run separate regressions, I find that older CEOs responds 
significantly to Duration when young CEOs do not. This is consistent with career concerns 
theory.   
Moreover, I find a significantly negative relation between Duration and CEO age, 
which means younger CEOs are given longer duration contracts. Therefore, it is likely that 
the board is aware of the tendency of younger CEOs to take more risk and they are giving 
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them longer duration contracts in an attempt to discourage excessive risk-taking 
activities. 
In addition, I do not find any statistically significant difference in risk-taking in the 
influence of Duration of compensation between two pairs of sub-groups. There is no 
significant difference in the change of riskiness measure for each change in Duration 
between young CEOs (<50 years old) and older CEOs (>50 years old). This is also the case 
for two sub-groups multiple time CEOs and first time CEOs. This means the magnitude of 
the impact of Duration on riskiness measure on multiple time CEOs is not significantly 
different from first time CEO. These results may be explained by the straightforward 
interpretation on Duration or the vesting period of equity compensation.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents related literature 
reviews and the development of hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the collection and 
treatments of data along with chosen methodology. Section 4 presents the results of 
empirical tests and their implications. Section 5 concludes the research. 
 
2. Literature reviews and hypothesis development. 
2.1. Agency theory 
The principal-agent problem as discussed by Pauly (1968) and Arrow (1971) 
persistently presents in modern shareholders – CEO relationship. Shareholders are 
protected by limited liabilities; therefore, their only objective is assumed to be maximizing 
value from their investments in companies. They would approve any project with a 
positive expected value which would net them consistent average value across many 
projects. Theoretically, shareholders are regarded as risk-neutral agents. 
However, shareholders often do not have the expertise to run the day-to-day 
business. Therefore, they hire managers to represent their interest in the firm. However, 
managers bear their own risk and have their own agenda and objectives, for example, 
wealth gains, job security or reputation. In addition, managers often have a strong 
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position in the firm along with a substantial financial reward for their work, therefore they 
would like to keep the stable occupation and income. That would lead to some risk-averse 
behaviors from managers and CEOs specifically so that they do not damage their career 
prospect.   
The risk-aversion of CEOs can easily affect corporate policies and hence conflict with 
the objective of shareholders. That is the classic principal-agent problem which is 
described by the agency theory. The usual solution to this problem is to offer CEOs 
compensation to induce them to accommodate shareholders’ interests and take more 
risk than they would personally take (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Stock pays are then 
introduced and stocks reward manager for any good performance as they are translated 
to stock price increases. This gives CEOs tangible stakes in the firm and hence induce them 
to think like one of the shareholders. As a result, acting in the interest of shareholders is 
easier since it would be similar to acting in the CEO’s own interest. At the same time, stock 
holdings expose managers to losses in wealth when the stock is not performing well 
(Guay, 1999). This could deter some managers from taking risks. Therefore, options are 
proved to be more effective in inducing risk-taking behaviors. Options eliminate the 
downside exposure of managers. They are now solely rewarded when stocks perform 
well. This is the reason why options and similarly restricted stock grants have become 
popular in modern compensation contracts.  
 
2.2. Career concerns and the horizon problem. 
Career concerns arise when the labor market looks at the present performance of 
CEOs to base future compensation, promotion or appointment decisions (Gibbon and 
Murphy, 1992). Career concerns were first discussed by Fama (1980) when he introduced 
a moving average process to wage revision of managers and considered managers’ wage 
can be related to the current expected value of her marginal product, in that, high-wage 
offers will go to managers with superior performance, while low-wage offers would go to 
managers with poor performance. Fama also argues that incentive contracts are not 
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necessary to discipline managers. They have the incentives to increase their output for 
higher wages in their firms or in the labor market in general. This relation should be 
essential for the labor market’s process of evaluating executives.  
Holmstrom (1999) offered a model that said the discipline of the labor market is not 
enough to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Without incentives 
contracts, managers would work too hard in the early year to provide information about 
their ability, and they would not work hard enough in later years. Holmstrom (1999) make 
the prediction with the dynamic side of career concerns. The labor market is looking to 
measure the talent of managers through a learning process and they are constantly 
gathering information to update their belief and evaluate managers to find the best 
talents. Career concerns suggest that managers are constantly working hard to provide 
good outputs, which is the primary source of information for the market, to bias the 
measurement process in their favor. The market often anticipates this level of efforts 
going into outputs and update their expected level of output. However, there is still the 
shortfall of producing under the market equilibrium and hence being assessed negatively 
by the market. Thus executives still have to put a lot of efforts to stay current in the 
market. This is called the reputation effect, where managers work hard for no apparent 
benefits (excluding the effect of compensation contracts at this point) apart from 
signaling the labor market. 
Gibbon and Murphy (1992) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that the older 
the managers, the more sensitive their optimal contract wage must be to their output. It 
shows that career concerns are more prominent for younger managers (and workers in 
generals) and their total incentives are less dominant by compensations. Therefore, for 
managers who are closest to retirement, their incentives are tied the most to 
compensation which means the least career concerns.  
Empirical evidence has been provided to examine the predictions of Fama (1980) and 
Holmstrom’s (1999) models. Gibbon and Murphy (1992) find that compensation is more 
sensitive to change in shareholders’ wealth for managers who are close to retirement 
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than younger managers. On the other hand, incentives from compensation contract 
increase constantly with age. Brickley et al. (1999) provide evidence of career concerns 
through the positive relation between accounting and stock market performance and the 
probability of post-retirement service at the board. In a non-executive context, Chevalier 
and Ellison (1999) provide support that younger mutual fund managers do not have the 
reputation to fall back on and thus are more likely to be fired from poor performance and 
failed risky investing strategies. Hong et al. (2000) discuss herd behaviors in earnings 
forecasts due to career concerns as younger analysts are punished more harshly for poor 
forecasting performance and forecasting boldness. Graham et al. (2005) find that career 
concerns such as building creditability with the labor market, improving the reputation of 
the management team and improving stock performance motivate managers to engage 
in earnings management. 
As CEOs get older, their career concerns diminish. Addressing the phenomena, Smith 
and Watts (1982) discusses the horizon problems, which are opportunistic behaviors 
managers take as their horizon grow shorter and focus on short-term performance rather 
than long-term value creation for the firm. They suggest managers with a shorter decision 
horizon have the incentives to choose projects with higher current accounting earnings 
even if they produce a lower net present value than others. Dechow and Sloan (1991) find 
supporting evidence for this hypothesis through the reducing research and development 
(R&D) expenses as CEOs approach their final years in office. R&D expenditures are 
considered long-term and uncertain investment, which does not help the present 
performance of the firms. This is consistent with the prediction of Gibbon and Murphy 
(1992) that CEOs have incentives to focus on short-term performance to increase their 
compensation from stock returns through their equity ownership. However, Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993) find little support for the relation after controlling for endogenous 
CEO turnover and firm performance. They find that in well-performing firms where CEOs 
retires as part of a relay process there are little discretions in R&D activities. Cheng (2004) 




2.3. Risk-taking behaviors of CEO 
The literature identifies the horizon problem of possible opportunistic behaviors 
caused by CEOs or executives short horizon. However, empirical research finds little 
evidence to support the full scope of the stated problem. At the same time, there is plenty 
of evidence suggesting that the problem associated with horizon is related to retirement 
rather than turnover or succession. This is however consistent with career concerns: 
turnover CEOs would still have a future career and therefore less likely to engage in 
opportunistic endeavors that could potentially damage future prospects. 
There is plenty of evidence supporting an inverse relation between CEO age and the 
riskiness of their action. Barker and Mueller (2002) find an inverse relation between CEO 
age and R&D expenditure after controlling for strategy, firms and managerial ownership. 
Serfling (2014) finds a more general conclusion which associates CEO age with a lower 
riskiness of corporate policies such as stock returns volatility, R&D intensity and operating 
leverage. Yim (2013) finds that “a firm with a CEO who is 20 years older is 30% less likely 
to announce an acquisition.” 
Career signal hypothesis 
Building on the arguments of career concerns, it is possible that younger CEOs are 
taking on more risk to send signals to the labor market, which is uncertain about the true 
ability and talent of young CEOs. Good output level can bias the evaluation procedure 
upward for any individual executives. Prendergast and Stole (1996) developed a model 
which demonstrates the career signal hypothesis. It is built on the assumption that the 
market evaluates an executive by her output and the accuracy of information that is used 
to shape her decisions. They show that a CEO will overreact to new information and 
exaggerate their opinion in the short term (which is risky) to appear talented and through 
that way build up their reputation. This would lead to a larger variance and thus more 
risk. A young CEO would benefit more from her longer remaining career and be more 
inclined to send signals about her ability to the market and hence willing to take more risk 
to do so. 
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Influence of overconfidence 
Overconfidence is one of the cognitive biases recognized by economic theory. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) measure overconfidence in CEOs by examining their 
option holdings. A manager is classified as overconfident if she holds options until they 
are close to expiration or consistently buy stocks of her company. The paper published in 
2005 finds that the investment policies of overconfident managers are more sensitive to 
cash flow, which means overconfident managers invest more than the rest when cash 
flow increases. Malmendier and Tate (2008) also find that overconfidence CEOs are more 
likely to initiate mergers on average. This is consistent with the intuition that 
overconfidence CEOs would take on more risk through increased investments and more 
mergers. Therefore, it is plausible that a higher overconfidence level causes young CEOs 
to take high-risk actions.   
Influence of compensation contract or duration of compensation contract 
Compensation structure has been known to affect CEOs’ attitude towards risks. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that CEO compensation is linked to firm value, through 
insider ownership and stock options. The goal of shareholders would be aligning CEO’s 
objective with the objective of the firm or tying their wealth to stock prices. This gives the 
CEOs a linear exposure to stock price which means they would benefit if the firm performs 
well and get punished if stock prices fall.  Risk-averse CEOs would not want to risk losing 
her own wealth if the firm does not perform and therefore be discouraged from taking 
risks.  
Boards of directors are aware of the problem and have been including stock options 
in compensation packages. Unlike stock holdings, stock options eliminate the downside 
risk, which means less punishment for taking risks and bad performance in general. This 
offset the concave utility function of risk-averse managers. Therefore, stock options are 
more effective in encouraging CEOs to take risks. Guay (1999) provides that the convexity 
encourages CEOs to tolerate more risk in their policies and not just increase stock prices. 
This is significant as Jensen and Murphy (1990) find stocks and options is the largest 
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component of the relation between the wealth of CEOs and the wealth of shareholders. 
Therefore, limiting downside risk would be detrimental in reducing CEO risk aversion. 
However, short-term stock-based compensation can also encourage myopic 
behaviors. Edmans, Fang, Lewellen (2017) find that CEOs take less risk in form of rejecting 
risky projects, manage earnings, etc. when their benefits from restricted stocks and 
options are close to vesting. This suggests that a shorter horizon of compensation may 
motivate CEOs to take less risk. 
Brisley (2006) examined the specificity of the incentives that CEOs derive from long 
maturity options. He finds that when options go deep in the money, they lose their 
convexity and CEOs are exposed to a straight line pay-off +until stock price falls back to 
strike price. His model shows that the exposure affect CEOs’ risk aversion and would result 
in more conservatism in their private risk portfolios, project selections, etc. The model 
also finds an early exercise provision can help the CEO realize the gain right away and stop 
the impact of in-the-money options on risk-taking. In summary, this suggests that a longer 
duration of compensation may increase risk-aversion in the decision making of CEOs. The 
effect of compensation duration will be examined empirically. 
 
2.4. CEO Tenure and CEO reputation 
Tenure likely reflects the influence of the CEOs on the board. Over time, CEOs can 
nominate new board members, giving them a personal connection and some power over 
the nominees (Pfeifer, 1972; Herman, 1981). Finkelstein & Hambrick (1989) argues they 
can also remove opposition from the board. Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) 
support this line of reasoning by showing a vulnerable period for the CEO after 
appointment. The longer the CEOs tenure, the board get shaped more in favor of the CEO, 
the larger the influence of the CEO on the board will be. With this power, CEOs can 
exercise more influence over the board decisions. In this case, we are interested in the 
decision of compensation given to the CEO. In addition, Wolfson (1984) states that CEOs 
held knowledge of the inner working of the firm, and other directors often rely on the 
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CEO, and a long-tenured CEO in particular, to obtain information about the firm. 
Furthermore, CEOs can be replaced if they do not perform well (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980; 
Brown, 1982). Therefore, a long-tenured CEO is likely to have good performances in the 
past. A good track record can give respect to the arguments and decisions of CEOs, which 
will give them a better chance to go through the board. In short, with more power (often 
a result of a long tenure), CEOs are in a better position to circumvent board control and 
negotiate a better compensation contract. 
Agency theory states the desire of shareholders to align their interest with the 
interests of CEOs so that executive truly represent investors’ interests in the firms. 
Therefore, shareholders would prefer a stronger link between CEO pay and performance 
to incentivize CEOs to create wealth (Grossman & Hart, 1983). Larcker (1983) argues that 
the strong link will also minimize CEO shirking. 
CEOs prefer more pay, more cash since with more stocks, they are exposed to 
downside risk when stock price decline. Hill and Phan (1991) document that stocks will 
also expose CEOs to factors that are out of their controls e.g. aggregate demand, overall 
stock market performance, inflation. Although stocks reward good performances, they 
shift some risk bearing burden from shareholders to CEOs.  In short, CEOs prefer their 
compensation duration to be shorter and shareholders prefer the duration to be longer. 
Simsek (2007) finds a positive relation between CEO tenure and the risk-taking 
propensity of the top management team. The authors describe long-tenured CEOs as 
seasoned executives who are familiar with the operation and environment of her 
particular firm and hence are more confident and more equipped to take on more 
strategic risk. 
 
2.5. Hypothesis development 
The executive labor market is constantly looking to evaluate the abilities of their 
participants to find the most valuable recruits for the corporations. Their main source of 
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information is the productivities of the executives and the performance of their firms. 
CEOs are evaluated in the same way and they monitor their performance for current and 
future job prospect. This is often referred to as career concerns. Career concerns predict 
that younger CEOs have a long future career ahead and hence are discouraged from 
taking too much risks that could damage their future prospect.   
However, empirical research has established a pattern of younger CEOs seemingly 
taking on more risk than older ones (Selfing, 2014; Yim, 2013; Barker and Mueller, 2002). 
Young CEOs spend more on risky investments and M&As, which imposes risks on their 
principal firms and their own careers. This is inconsistent with career concerns theory 
which suggests failure early on in ones’ career will affect future prospects (Gibbon and 
Murphy, 1992; Holmstrom, 1999). 
One possible explanation for the pattern is that managers want to signal their ability 
and talent to the market. Prendergast and Stole (1996) discuss this pattern and explain it 
through the competitive labor market, which assesses and evaluate the abilities of 
managers based on their observable output and performance. In particular, young CEOs 
have the incentive to take on more risks for the chance of superior performances 
compared to her peers. 
Another explanation is the incentive derived from their compensation contract. 
Compensation contract affects risk-taking behaviors. Agency theory cautions of possible 
risk-aversion in the actions of CEOs. CEOs in their esteemed positions and considerable 
financial rewards would not want to take risks that would damage their career. This effect 
is specifically prominent with younger CEOs who have more serious career concerns. It is 
possible that boards are aware of the career concerns of young CEOs and give them short 
duration contracts to motivate them to take more risk. This informs my first hypothesis: 
H1: Controlling for CEO compensation and overconfidence, younger CEOs prefer less 
risk than their older counterparts due to career concerns.  
H1a: Controlling for CEO compensation and overconfidence, younger CEOs prefer 
more risk than their older counterparts to suggest their potential to the labor market. 
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Melmendier and Tate (2008) state that overconfident executives are more tolerant 
toward risks and more likely to take on M&A activities. They quantify overconfidence in 
terms of the amount of unexercised vested stock options and its effect on decision 
making. Overconfident CEOs hold vested options in anticipation of good performance and 
better stock price as a result. With such optimistic expectation, they would be more likely 
to take on risk to benefit from their compensation, especially stock-based compensation. 
Therefore I expect overconfident CEOs to be more sensitive to the duration of their 
compensation contracts. 
There are mixed results from research in psychology about changes in 
overconfidence with age, depending on its origin. If overconfidence comes from self-
attribution and survival, older CEOs will be more overconfident (Doukas and Petmezas, 
2007; Billett and Qian, 2008). If the origin is cognitive bias and desire for actions, younger 
CEOs will be more overconfident (Kovalchik et al, 2005; Forbes, 2005). 
Career concerns exist when the labor market observes its participants performance 
to evaluate their position prospect and compensation. As age increases, the length of 
their career shortens and career concerns decrease. That means older CEOs concern less 
about future career and more about their compensation. Therefore, I expect older CEOs 
to be more sensitive towards their compensation contract. 
H2: Older CEOs are more sensitive to the duration of their compensation contract 
which will manifest through a higher sensitivity of riskiness measures toward changes in 
Duration.  
There is currently no literature on CEOs who is holding the position for the first time. 
Therefore, I theorize that first time CEO would have many other concerns other than her 
compensation e.g. getting to know the job, the specifics of the firm, working with the 
board, getting a good performance. Hence, I expect first time CEOs to be less sensitive 
towards their compensation contract.  
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H3: First time CEOs are less sensitive to their duration of compensation contract which 
will manifest through a lower sensitivity of riskiness measures toward changes in 
Duration. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
In order to calculate the duration of CEOs’ compensation, I require the vesting 
schedules of their granted options, restricted stock grants and other long-term 
compensation, which is not available through publicly available databases. The vesting 
schedules of these grants are obtained through Equilar Inc. who collects the information 
through corporate filings. The information available from Equilar Inc. include the name of 
CEOs, firm name, year of grants, type of grants (generally option, restricted stock grant, 
long-term cash; grants can be further classified by annual awards, new hire award, special 
awards, etc) vesting schedule (of executive compensation), vesting period, grant date 
present value of each grants and performance criteria if applicable.  
Due to the lacking of information to evaluate whether the performance criteria are 
met (namely the actual value of the objectives), I disregard the performance components 
and treat them similarly to other grants. The dataset contains information on 
compensation for CEOs from S&P 1500 firms from 2013 to 2016 (newest period where all 
needed data are available). The original data has 19,992 observations, which are 
aggregated into the final data set of 5,207 CEO – year combinations (average 3.6336 
grants per CEO-year). Names of CEOs come in the form of (Last name, First name) which 
does not match with the full name from other databases (i.e. Execucomp). However, the 
separate components of the name are available from Execucomp and can be combined 
to create a matched identity with the Equilar dataset. With the inclusion of this step, the 
two databases merge reasonably well with rare misses. Other information is matched by 
tickers (provided within the data set) and CUSIPs (matched from tickers). 
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I obtain compensation information for CEOs from Execucomp, namely names of 
CEOs, total compensation, current compensation, CEOs’ age, unexercised exercisable 
options (a proxy for overconfidence) and tenure. COMPUSTAT provides firms accounting 
and more firm-specific data and CRSP provides information on stock price/returns. The 
final dataset has the form of panel data and I include year and industry fixed effects (2-




I use OLS regression models to establish relationships between the variables. Since 
this is an effort to determine the effect of compensation on decision making and risk-
taking behaviors of CEOs, dependent variables of the models will be measurements or 
proxies of such activities. The first of these variables is Stock returns volatility, which is a 
proxy for overall firm risk. In order to calculate the needed yearly volatility to go with 
other yearly data, I use stock returns data obtained from CRSP and calculate the standard 
deviation of usually 12 monthly stock returns values.  
The second dependent variable chosen is R&D intensity, which represents the 
amount of risky investments that a firm commits to in a year. R&D intensity is defined as 
total R&D expense divided by total assets, which are both available from COMPUSTAT. 
R&D expense calls for some attention in treatment because it is not as well populated in 
COMPUSTAT compared to other variables. There have been practices that missing value 
can be set to 0. However, it is possible that the missing value can include firms with high 
levels of R&D, therefore setting R&D to 0 can disturb the estimation of other regression 
coefficients. Thus, I choose to drop the observations with missing R&D value from the 
final presented model. My final model with R&D includes 2975 observation.  
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The third dependent variable is CAPEX which measures long-term investment. CAPEX 
is one possible channel for the CEO to influence firm risk. The variable used in the model 
is scaled by total assets of the corresponding firm.   
Independent variables 
Duration: I use Compensation duration as a proxy for the impact of compensation 
contracts on the decision making horizon of CEOs. The measure was first systematically 
developed and documented by Gopalan et al (2014). Conceptually, it treats the vesting of 
options similar to the payments from fixed income bond and derives a duration in the 
same way. Cliff vesting payments which vest all at once are treated like zero coupon 
bonds and given a duration of its time to vesting (e.g. a payment which vests in 3 years 
has a duration of 3). Graded vesting payments, which vest an equal portion every year, 
are treated like coupon bonds and given a duration of (N+1)/2 (in which N is the vesting 
period of the grant). The measure gives me an average of vesting schedules of CEOs equity 
compensation. I expect that the duration of compensation has an impact on the decision-
making process of CEOs or in other words, a significant relationship between 
compensation duration and measure of the riskiness of firms.  
Following Coles et al. (2006) and Serfling (2014), I include some variables that 
potentially correlate with riskiness measures, CEO age and Duration. Specifically, they are: 
(i) log of assets which controls for firm size, (ii) tenure which arguably controls for the 
influence of CEOs on the board according to Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988), 
(iii) cash compensation which may have an impact on risk tolerance and investment, (iv) 
overconfidence which is proxied by the amount of unexercised exercisable option 
holdings of the CEO (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), (v) stock returns which affect CEO 
wealth, (vi) cash holdings which affects capability to take risks, (vii) book-to-market ratio 
which controls for growth opportunity, (viii) ROA which controls for profitability, (ix) 
Leverage which can affect costs of risk-taking, (x) Dividends which is in the same vein as 
cash, if a firm pays out lots of dividends, there may be less cash left and (xi) Sales growth 
which controls for the rate of growth of the firm. 
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3.3. Duration calculation 
Following Gopalan et al. (2014), I calculate a measure of Duration of CEO 
compensation with the formula as follow: 
Duration = 
 ∑ Restricted stocki ×ti+ 
ns
i=1
∑ Optiont×tj  
ns
j=1
 ∑ Restricted stocki + 
ns
i=1
∑ Optiont  
ns
j=1
   (1) 
where ns is the number of restricted stock grants for one CEO in a year, no is the equivalent 
for stock options granted, ti is the duration factor for a particular restricted stock grant i 
and tj is the duration factor for a particular option j. It is straightforward to obtain the 
duration factor for cliff vesting grants, the factor is the vesting period (time to 
exercisable/vest) of such grant. In the case of graded vesting grants, with the vesting 
period t, the duration factor is (t+1)/2. 
I also use the original formula from Gopalan et al. (2014) as a measure for Duration 
which is: 
Duration wcc = 
( Salary + Bonus) ×0+∑ Restricted stockI × ti+ 
ns
i=1
∑ Optiont × tj  
ns
j=1
(Salary + Bonus) + ∑ Restricted stockI + 
ns
i=1
∑ Optiont  
ns
j=1
   (2) 
The difference between the two measures is the inclusion of the cash component of 
CEO compensation which is the sum of her Salary and Bonus. I left the cash compensation 
component out of the first duration measure due to the dynamic between compensation 
and risk-taking activities. Guay (1999) points out that it is the stock holding of CEOs and 
her equity payment that links CEOs’ own wealth and risk portfolio to the stock price of 
the firm. This forces CEOs to take her own wealth into consideration when making a 
decision for the firm e.g. a risky venture going wrong can do damage to the wealth of the 
CEO. Therefore, I am mostly interested in the impact of equity compensation on the risk 







4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation table 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in empirical tests. The 
first variable of interest is CEO Age (Age) which has the mean of 57.04. The youngest CEO 
in the sample is 34 years old and the oldest is 93 years old. The second variable of interest 
is Duration, which has the mean of 2.19 and the standard deviation of 0.71. This also 
means that two third of the Duration data is between 1.48 and 2.9. The low standard 
deviation means Duration concentrates around the mean. 
Similarly, the four dependent variables also concentrated around the mean and they 
are positively skewed with low standard deviation with some extremes. Stock returns 
volatility has the mean of 0.08, standard deviation of 0.04 and maximum 0.72; the 
respective measures for R&D intensity are 0.04, 0.06 and 0.58; the respective measures 
for CAPEX are 0.04, 0.05 and 0.48.  
T-test for differences in means between age groups 
I split the full CEO sample into three groups which are Young (50 years old or 
younger), Middle (between 51 and 60 years old) and Old (over 60 years old). I then 
perform t-tests to find the differences in means of characteristics between the age 
groups. The universal null hypothesis is the mean of a characteristic (e.g. Duration, 
Overconfidence and Tenure) of one age group is not different in comparison to another 
age group. Table 2 shows the results of the t-tests. 
I find the mean Duration for CEOs in the Old group to be lower than the other two 
(Young and Middle, whch have equal means of Duration). In addition, CEOs in the Young 
group tend to work for smaller firms with higher stock returns volatility and higher R&D 
intensity. Furthermore, CEOs in the Young and Old groups have the same level of 
overconfidence. The mean overconfidence measure for the Old group (1.8664) is 





Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables in the regression 
models. Disregarding very similar variable (Duration – Duration wcc, Stock returns 
volatility – idiosyncratic risk), there is almost no correlation problem between variables.  
The pairs of variables which have a high correlation coefficient are Age - Tenure (0.45) 
and Duration wcc (with cash compensation) - cash compensation (-0.42). The highest 
correlation involving log of assets (size) is with idiosyncratic risk (-0.36). All variance 
inflation factors do not point out any multicollinearity problem, except for the models 
with interaction terms. 
 
4.2. Duration and firm riskiness measures. 
In order to establish the relation between duration of compensation contract and 
risk-taking activities, I build OLS models with Stock returns volatility, R&D intensity and 
CAPEX as dependent variables. Stock returns volatility proxies for overall firm risk. Risky 
business activities attract attention, especially for large, famous and closely followed (by 
specialists) firms. Information from risky activities is reported and reflected in stock prices 
and its volatility. Higher stock price volatility indicates more risky risk portfolio from the 
corresponding firm. R&D is considered risky investments as it takes away resources from 
the day-to-day operation and does not guarantee breakthrough or successes. Higher R&D 
expenses usually mean a higher tolerance toward risk. CAPEX represents long-term 
investment activities of firms. Higher CAPEX means the firm is investing more. 
I expect the independent variables of interest which are Duration to be significant 
and Age to be insignificant. Table 4 report the results for the regression models. All 
models include industry fixed effects and year fixed effects.  
Column 1 demonstrates the result of the model with Stock returns volatility. The 
model has a fitness measure R2 of 0.3823, which means the model explains 38.23% of the 
variation in Stock returns volatility. Note that this R2 measure includes the explaining 
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power of the industry and year fixed effects. Without these indicator variables, R2 stays 
at 0.2735. In the fixed effects model, the variable Age has a coefficient of -0.0001, which 
is significant at 10% level of confidence. This suggests older CEOs take less risk and 
younger CEOs tend to show a higher level of risk, which is reflected in overall firm risk. 
This is consistent with Yim (2013) and Serfling (2014) who report a similar pattern. The 
result supports the career signal hypothesis, which suggests that younger CEOs take more 
chances since if they succeed, they would look talented and gain more benefits with their 
longer remaining career (Prendergast and Stole, 1996). 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of Duration is -0.0026, which is significant at 1% level. This 
means when Duration increases by one, Stock returns volatility decreases by 0.0026. In 
the case of long duration contract, a CEO with a Duration of 10 (longest in the sample) 
can be expected to exhibit a Stock returns volatility 0.0182 lower in than a CEO with a 
Duration of 3 (which would consist of only the most popular vesting period – 3 years). 
This specific difference is 45.5% of a standard deviation of Stock returns volatility. The 
number indicates a small economic significance in the relation. 
 This result supports Brisley (2006), who suggests that stock options with longer 
durations are more likely to get in-the-money in the course of its vesting period and 
subsequently creates a paper gain for the CEO who holds the options. Therefore, CEOs 
are more hesitant to damage that gains through risky decisions.  
To investigate the effect of compensation duration on firm risk more closely, I rerun 
the model on the unsystematic component of firm risk. Column 2 shows the result of this 
evaluation. In that case, the coefficient remains significant at -0.0022, which is less in 
terms of absolute value than -0.0026 in the Stock returns volatility model. This suggests 
Duration does affect stock returns volatility through unsystematic risk-taking activities 
which include investment project choices.   
Column 3 demonstrates the result of the model with R&D intensity. The model has 
an R2 of 0.4462 which means 44.62% of the variation in R&D intensity is explained. Similar 
to firm risk, the coefficient for Age is negative and significant, which supports the career 
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signal hypothesis. Duration has a coefficient of -0.0024, which is significant at 5% level. 
This means when Duration increases by 1, R&D intensity decreases by 0.0024. In the case 
of long duration contracts, a seven years increase in duration is expected to lead to a 
decrease of 0.0168 in R&D intensity, which is 28% of a standard deviation of R&D 
intensity. This result supports Brisley (2006) who suggests that longer duration options 
and stock grants will likely go in-the-money at some point in the future and that would 
cause CEOs to be more careful not to lose that gain to failed risky activities.  
CAPEX is one of the other possible channels for the CEO to adjust the level of risk of 
the firm. Column 4 shows the regression result with CAPEX as the dependent variable. 
The model has an R2 of 0.5054, which is higher than the other previously mentioned 
models. However, both Age and Duration is not significant in this model. I rerun the model 
without the fixed effect to find a very low R2 (0.0458) and Duration (not Age) is negative 
and significant at 1% level. This suggests CAPEX varies more with the calendar years and 
industries more than corporate finance/corporate governance factors. Furthermore, 
Duration is negative and significant in this model and the effect disappears with the 
control of year and industry fixed effect. This suggests there can be an influence of 
duration of compensation on which year CAPEX is high or low. From what we know in 
literature, such year can be the one which the CEO has a large portion of his 
options/grants vested and the vesting of equity influence the choice of investments 
(Lewellen et al., 2017), and hence affect the level of CAPEX. 
In addition, the control variables offer some insight into the factors that affect the 
risk preference of the firms. Although different independent variables affect each 
riskiness measures differently, several are consistently significant across all four models 
i.e. log of assets, leverage, book to market ratio, cash. Tenure is consistently insignificant 
in most models except for R&D models (where it is positive and significant).  
I set up the experiment with the expectation that compensation duration may explain 
the negative relation between CEO age and risk-taking behaviors despite the presence of 
career concerns. Serfling (2014) and Yim (2013) find the negative relation between Age 
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and risky investments and the likelihood of M&A activity respectively. The inclusion of the 
variable Duration fails to meet the expectation of accounting for the deviation from 
career concerns theory in empirical evidence. Therefore, the career signal hypothesis, 
which dictates that CEOs are taking more risk to take chances for further success, prevails. 
This result support hypothesis H1a. Other possible explanations are differences between 
younger and older CEOs such as risk aversion level, wealth or the effect of other unknown 
omitted variables. 
 
4.3. Duration with current compensation. 
I rerun all four regression models with the original measure of Duration developed 
by Gopalan (2014). Table 5 reports the result of the procedure. Note that Duration with 
current compensation (Duration wcc) is only used here, all other analyses use Duration. I 
expect the substitution will not affect the other variables significantly. 
Similar to the previous analyses, column 1 of table 5 shows the result of the model 
with Stock returns volatility. The significance of Age as expected does not change 
significantly with just a change of Duration measure; the coefficient remains negative and 
significant at 10% level. The same happens to Duration wcc. Its coefficient is -0.0021, 
which significant at 1% level, however smaller in absolute value than its counterpart in 
the previous analyses (-0.0026). 
The change appears in the model with R&D intensity. The coefficient of Duration wcc 
is insignificant. Given that in the previous model (with equity only Duration) involving R&D 
intensity, Duration is significant and Cash compensation is insignificant, we can infer that 
the effect of compensation duration or compensation on R&D investment comes mostly 
from the equity rewards.  
Similarly, Duration wcc have no statistically significant impact on CAPEX, which is 
similar to the equity-only Duration measure. However, the coefficient of Duration wcc 
comes very close to a weak relation with CAPEX (p = 0.1245) compared to the original 
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measure (p = 0.5299). Furthermore, cash compensation is insignificant in both models 
with CAPEX (the model which uses Duration and the model which uses Duration wcc). 
Therefore, there may be some relations that is worth exploring for future researches, 
even though I cannot find definitive evidence for them with this model and this dataset.  
 
4.4. Age and Duration 
Table 6 presents the univariate regression Duration on Age. The variable Age has a 
coefficient of -0.0042, which is negative and significant (p = 0.0009). This means a CEO 
who is ten years older tends to have her average compensation duration shorter by 0.04. 
This relation suggests that long duration contracts are granted significantly more to 
younger CEOs.  
As I established in previous chapters, Age and Duration both correlate negatively with 
the riskiness measures of the firm. In that context, the negative relation between Age and 
Duration themselves suggests that the board is aware of the risk tolerance differences 
between young and older CEOs and may be given out suitable compensation contract 
already. It is possible that they perceive young CEOs to be more risk tolerant then set 
them longer duration compensation contract to discourage risk-taking behaviors and vice 
versa.    
 
4.5. Interaction models. 
In order to measure the different risk preference of different age group, I add 
interaction variables to the existing model. However, it is not yet clear the sign of the 
impact of Age on risk and onto each other, multiplying Age and Duration may cancel out 
some effect. Instead, I transform the continuous Age into an indicator variable for the 
group of young CEO (Young – for CEOs under 50 years old). The variable of Young times 
Duration will show the difference in the impact of duration on risk-taking activities 
between young CEOs and the rest of the sample.  
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If the interaction terms are significant, the model predicts that each unit of change 
in Duration would lead to a different change of riskiness measures for young CEOs than 
older CEOs. A positive coefficient would suggest riskiness measures for young CEOs would 
fluctuate more which means they are more sensitive to compensation duration than old 
CEOs. 
Panel A of table 7 shows the regression results from the interaction models. I left out 
the CAPEX model as we do not see an impact of Duration in that model. In both models, 
the interaction variables are insignificant. This means there is no difference between 
young CEOs and others regarding the impact of compensation duration on risk-taking 
behaviors. This result does not support H2. 
The insignificance of the interaction terms can be a result of multicollinearity 
between the interaction variables and the age indicator Young and Duration. For example, 
in the model with Stock returns volatility (without fixed effects), variance inflation factors 
of the interaction term and Young is 11.18 and 11.00 respectively. I also run the analysis 
for the interaction term Age*Duration. The coefficient is also insignificant and the 
variance inflation factor for the interaction term is 52.76. 
 
4.6. Age group panels 
In order to investigate more closely whether compensation contracts affect different 
CEOs age groups differently, I divide the sample into three age groups and analyze them 
separately. The groups of CEOs are Young (50 years old or younger), Middle (age, between 
51 and 60 years old) Old (over 60 years old). I then rerun the regression models on 
riskiness measures for each group. 
Table 8 shows the results of the analyses. Due to the grouping by Age, the coefficient 
of Age loses its significance in most of the models, except the ones in R&D intensity 
models for Middle and Old group. In these cases, they are negative and significant, which 
suggests the existence of the horizon problem in the Old group and maybe the older part 
of the Middle group.  
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Duration retains its negative and significant coefficients for half of the models (model 
2, 3 and 6) and loses significance in the other half. In the regressions with Stock returns 
volatility, Duration is significant for the Middle (model 2) and the Old (model 3) group and 
not significant in the Young group (model 1). Furthermore, the coefficient of Duration is 
larger in term of absolute value in the Old group model (-0.0032) than the Middle group 
model (-0.0018), which means CEOs from the Old group is responding more sensitively to 
Duration. This is consistent with career concern theory, which states that young CEOs 
would focus more on performance for the assessment of the labor market while older 
CEOs with a shorter remaining career would emphasize compensation. In the regressions 
with R&D intensity, the pattern is somewhat similar in which younger CEOs put less 
emphasis on Duration. However, in this case, only the coefficient of Duration in the Old 
panel (model 6) is significant. This is a piece of evidence that supports H2. In short, this 
suggests that Age affects the interpretation of Duration and the reverse is not supported. 
Duration should not be a factor that drives negative relationship between Age and risk 
tolerance.  
  
4.7. First time CEOs. 
Regarding first time CEOs, the initial hypothesis is, first time CEOs would be a distinct 
minority who are new to the job and would have other more imminent concerns than 
their compensation. If that is the case, they may react differently to their compensation. 
However, through analysis, I find that most of the CEOs in the data are first time CEOs in 
that they have not been noted as a CEO before in Execucomp. In the data set, only 43 
CEOs have appeared at least once before as a CEO in Execucomp. Only 118 CEOs have 
appeared in Execucomp as an executive before in any position.   
I mark multiple times or seasoned CEOs by a value of 1 in an indicator variable while 
other CEOs have a value of 0. I then multiply this indicator variable with Duration to 
examine the sensitivity of riskiness measure to changes in Duration in the sub-group of 
seasoned CEOs. If the interaction terms are significant, the model predicts that each unit 
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of change in Duration would lead to a different change of riskiness measures for young 
CEOs than older CEOs. A positive coefficient would mean riskiness measures for multiple 
times CEOs would fluctuate more which means they are more sensitive to Duration than 
first time CEOs. 
Panel B of table 7 shows the result of this analysis. I find the coefficients of the 
interaction terms to be insignificant with both Stock returns volatility and R&D intensity. 
This means there is no overall difference in the impact of Duration on risk-taking 
behaviors between first time and multiple times CEOs. This remark does not support H3. 
This can be the result of the straightforward interpretation of the vesting periods of equity 
compensation. 
 
4.8. Duration and M&A activities.  
In order to further examine the effect of Duration on risk-taking behaviors, I rerun 
the models in regards to M&A activities. In previous sections, I find longer Duration causes 
CEOs to be more conservative and take less risk. Therefore, I expect longer Duration to 
be associated with less risky M&A deals and smaller deal size. The sample of M&A 
activities includes 277 M&A deals made by S&P 1500 companies between 2013 and 2016. 
Table 9 reports the results of these regression models. Similar to the previous models, 
Panel A presents the OLS regression of Relative deal size on Age, Duration and other 
control variables. Panel B presents the logistic regressions with indicators variables as 
dependent variables i.e. Multiple (M&A deals in the same year), Different 2 digits or 4 
digits SIC code (between the acquirer and the target, which are considered more risky 
M&A deals). 
Across all models, Duration is not significant and has no power in explaining the size 
of M&A deals, whether the buying company conducts more than one M&A deals and 
whether the targets is in the same industry (same 2 digits, same 4 digits SIC code) with 
the acquirer. On the other hand, there is a negative and significant relation between Age 
and Multiple. In the same model, Tenure and ROA are both positive and significant which 
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means growing firms along with longer tenure CEOs (who are associated with more power 
over the board of directors) are more likely to bid in multiple M&A deals. This suggests 
Multiple can be signaling for empire building. In that context, the negative relation 
between Age and Multiple suggests younger CEOs may be more likely to engage in empire 
building behaviors. These are very preliminary results which have rooms for further 
analysis.     
 
5. Limitation and suggestions for future researches 
While the research contributes to the literature in CEO risk-taking behaviors, it has 
certain limitations. The first limitation is the small sample size. The analysis only uses four 
years of data (2013 to 2016) due to the limited availability of vesting schedule data. A 
longer sample period will improve the reliability of the results. Secondly, empirical tests 
in the study do not control for the effect of founder – CEOs on the data. Founder – CEOs 
have a unique stake in the firm, hence their risk portfolio involving business decisions can 
be different from the other CEOs. Such different risk portfolio may bias the result 
significantly. 
Future researches in the area of literature can explore CEO risk-taking behaviors from 
other perspectives. Other studies can explore the effect of Age and Duration on the 
riskiness of CAPEX (some capital investments can be riskier than others), different hiring 
decisions or riskiness of projects selection.     
 
6. Conclusion. 
In this paper, I investigate corporate risk-taking behaviors in relation to the most 
important decision maker of a firm, the CEO. The characteristics that I focused on are CEO 
age and compensation contract, especially the duration of the contract. I find that CEO 
age has a significantly negative relation to overall firm risk and R&D investment. This 
means younger CEOs tend to show higher firm risk and to have more investment in R&D. 
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This is inconsistent with career concerns theory and consistent with the career signal 
hypothesis which suggests young CEOs risk failures for chances of significant success and 
gains reputation from such success.  
I intend to use new controls to reconcile the empirical evidence with career concerns 
theory such as Duration, Tenure, and Overconfidence. However, this is not the case and 
the relation remains negative with all the control included. This may be due to the validity 
and influence of career signal hypothesis or other factors, e.g. differences in risk aversion 
level, wealth level between CEO age groups, other unknown omitted variables. These can 
be avenues for future analyses. On the other hand, by dividing the sample into three age 
groups (Young, Middle and Old), I find that older groups of CEOs put more emphasis and 
react more sensitively to compensation duration. The difference suggests that Age 
influences the interpretation of Duration, not the reverse. The pattern is consistent with 
career concerns theory.   
In addition, there is a negative and significant relation between Duration and 
measures of risk-taking (Stock returns volatility, R&D intensity) in corporate activities. This 
suggests that longer-duration CEO compensation contracts lead to significantly lower 
overall firm risk and fewer R&D investments. At the same time, Duration is not 
significantly related to CAPEX, which means longer Duration does not lead to more 
investments, but more risky investments e.g. R&D, riskier projects.  
I analyze the interaction between Duration and sub-groups of the CEO sample. I find 
that for each unit of change in Duration, the subsequent change in riskiness measures of 
younger CEOs is not significantly different from that of older CEOs. This is also the case 
with the first time – multiple time CEOs pair of sub-groups. These results may be explained 
by the straightforward interpretation of the vesting period of equity compensation. 
Furthermore, there is no association between Duration and any examined M&A related 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
  
Age  The age of the CEO in the year of the observation 
Cash comp Sum of salary and Bonus 
Duration Duration of compensation contract, following Gopalan et al. (2014), calculated by formula (1) 
Duration wcc Duration of compensation contract, following Gopalan et al. (2014), calculated by formula (2) 
Overconfidence Unexercised exercisable options CEOs divided by total compensation (from Execucomp) 
Tenure Difference between observation year and year become CEO 
Dividends Total dividends divided by total assets (from COMPUSTAT) 
Cash Cash holding of the company over total assets (from COMPUSTAT) 
BM  Book to market ratio: total book value divided by total market value (from COMPUSTAT) 
ROA  Returns on Assets: Net profits over total assets 
Leverage  Long-term debt over total assets 
Stock returns  Average of monthly stock returns for the year 
Sale growth  Percentage changes of sales of observation year to the previous year 
Log of assets Logarithm to the base 10 of total asset 
Stock returns volatility Standard deviation of monthly stock returns of observation year 
Idiosyncratic risk Idiosyncratic component of stock returns volatility, calculated by taking the systematic risk 
component (by Market model) out of total risk (stock ret vol)  
R&D Intensity Total R&D expense over total assets 
CAPEX Total capital expenditure over total assets 
Young 1 if CEO who are 50 years old or under, 0 otherwise 
Middle 1 if CEO who are between 51 and 60 years old or under, 0 otherwise 
Old 1 if CEO who are over 60 years old, 0 otherwise 
2ndtimeCEO 1 if CEO has who held the position before, 0 otherwise 
Relative deal size Value of an M&A deal divided by total market value 
Different n-digit SIC 1 if the M&A acquirer and target have the same n-digits (2 or 4 digits) SIC code, 0 otherwise 
Multiple  1 if the M&A acquirer enters in multiple M&A deals that year, 0 otherwise 
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Appendix B. Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Label N Mean Std 
Dev 
Sum Minimum Maximum 
Age 5207 57.08 6.92 297238.00 34.00 93.00 
Duration 5207 2.19 0.71 11379.00 0.00 10.00 
Duration wcc 5207 1.72 0.67 8946.00 0.00 9.39 
Cash comp 5207 0.23 0.20 1197.00 0.00 1.00 
Overconfidence 5207 1.66 3.76 8621.00 0.00 72.25 
Tenure 5207 7.47 7.22 38901.00 0.00 53.00 
Cash 5207 0.10 0.11 523.57 0.00 0.75 
Dividends 5207 0.02 0.03 84.93 0.00 1.17 
BM 5207 0.45 0.38 2325.00 -2.80 6.98 
ROA 5207 0.05 0.09 239.08 -1.33 0.46 
Leverage 5207 0.23 0.21 1178.00 0.00 3.00 
Stock returns 5207 0.01 0.03 73.59 -0.43 0.23 
Sale growth 5207 0.07 0.30 346.82 -0.81 9.15 
Log of assets 5207 3.57 0.73 18614.00 1.65 6.41 
Stock returns volatility 5207 0.08 0.04 407.33 0.00 0.72 
Idiosyncratic risk 5189 0.07 0.04 347.62 0.00 0.58 
R&D intensity 2975 0.04 0.06 119.50 0.00 0.59 







Table 2. T-tests results 
This table presents the results of t-tests for difference in mean between three groups: Young, Middle and 
Old. For brevity, group 1, 2, 3 denotes the Young, Middle, Old groups respectively. Column 2 compares of 
the mean of Young to Middle. Column 3 compares of the mean of Middle to Old. Column 1 compares of the 
mean Old to Young. 
 Young 
p-value 
1 vs 2 (2) Middle 
p-value 
2 vs 3 (3) Old 
p-value 
3 vs 1 (1) 
Duration 2.2048 0.8858 = 2.2010 0.0259 > 2.1444 0.0682 < 
Stock returns volatility 0.0843 <.0001 > 0.0775 0.3121 = 0.0762 <.0001 < 
R&D intensity 0.0554 <.0001 > 0.0371 0.7343 = 0.0363 <.0001 < 
CAPEX 0.0399 0.0669 < 0.0431 0.5221 = 0.0421 0.2504 = 
Current comp 0.2413 0.0022 > 0.2177 0.0001 < 0.2469 0.5296 = 
Log_assets 3.3574 <.0001 < 3.6260 0.2334 = 3.5979 <.0001 > 
BM 0.4286 0.1155 = 0.4531 0.4180 = 0.4442 0.3263 = 
Leverage 0.2141 0.0159 < 0.2350 0.0030 > 0.2164 0.7993 = 







Table 3. Correlation table. 






Ten. Cash Div. 
 













Age 1.00                  
Cash comp 0.04 1.00                 
Duration -0.05 -0.10 1.00                
Duration wcc -0.09 -0.42 0.84 1.00               
Overconfidence 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 1.00              
Tenure 0.45 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.15 1.00             
Cash -0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.19 0.05 1.00            
Dividends 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.13 -0.05 -0.14 1.00           
BM 0.01 0.16 -0.04 -0.10 -0.15 -0.01 -0.17 0.10 1.00          
ROA 0.03 -0.09 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.16 -0.02 -0.25 1.00         
Leverage -0.02 -0.16 0.03 0.12 -0.02 -0.11 -0.23 0.11 -0.25 -0.14 1.00        
Stock returns -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.02 0.09 -0.13 -0.22 0.14 -0.07 1.00       
Sale growth -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.04 0.09 -0.10 -0.10 0.07 0.00 0.12 1.00      
Log of assets 0.06 -0.35 0.16 0.29 -0.22 -0.10 -0.38 0.18 0.11 -0.05 0.17 -0.08 -0.11 1.00     
Stock returns volatility -0.05 0.17 -0.11 -0.13 0.08 -0.02 0.16 -0.13 0.15 -0.28 0.04 0.11 0.08 -0.33 1.00    
Idiosyncratic risk -0.07 0.20 -0.11 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.17 -0.15 0.16 -0.29 0.02 0.10 0.11 -0.36 0.95 1.00   
R&D -0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.44 -0.17 -0.12 -0.19 -0.19 0.10 0.16 -0.22 0.22 0.22 1.00  




Table 4. Duration and riskiness measure 
This table reports the OLS regression results with riskiness measures as dependent variables. Dependent 
variables of each regression model are at the top of each result column. The data consists of panel data of 
CEO-year observation on an annual basis. All models include industry (2 digits SIC code) and year fixed 
effects.  All variables are described in appendix A. Intercept not reported. 0.0000 denotes coefficients 
whose absolute values are smaller than 5x105. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes 














 Age -0.0001 * -0.0002 *** -0.0007 *** 0.0000  
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 Duration -0.0026 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0024 ** -0.0004  
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0007) 
 Tenure -0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 *** 0.0001  
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 Dividends -0.0614 *** -0.0502 ** -0.0624 * -0.0231  
 (0.0174) (0.0198) (0.0368) (0.0184) 
 Cash comp 0.0073 *** 0.0092 *** -0.0043 0.0029  
 (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0047) (0.0028) 
 Cash 0.0311 *** 0.0326 *** 0.1354 *** -0.0299 *** 
 (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0084) (0.0053) 
 Overconfidence 0.0003 ** 0.0004 *** 0.0002 0.0000  
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
 BM 0.0226 *** 0.0200 *** -0.0347 *** -0.0140 *** 
 (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0016) 
 ROA -0.1023 *** -0.0982 *** -0.1694 *** 0.0005  
 (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0109) (0.0059) 
 Leverage 0.0261 *** 0.0216 *** -0.0385 *** -0.0072 ** 
  (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0029) 
 Stock returns 0.2951 *** 0.2465 *** 0.0124 -0.0997 *** 
 (0.0180) (0.0169) (0.0328) (0.0191) 
 Sale growth 0.0088 *** 0.0106 *** 0.0116 *** -0.0006  
 (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0017) 
 Log assets -0.0164 *** -0.0166 *** -0.0026 * -0.0068 *** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008)  (0.0015) (0.0009) 
 R2 0.3824 0.3969  0.4462  0.5055  
 N 5207 5189  2975  5207  






Table 5. Duration with current compensation 
This table reports the OLS regression results with riskiness measures as dependent variables. Dependent 
variables of each regression model are at the top of each result column. The data consists of panel data of 
CEO-year observation on an annual basis. All models include industry (2 digits SIC code) and year fixed 
effects.  All variables are described in appendix A. Intercept not reported. 0.0000 denotes coefficients 
whose absolute values are smaller than 5x105. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes 














 Age  -0.0001 *  -0.0002 ***  -0.0006 ***  0.0000   
  (0.0001)    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 Duration wcc -0.0021 ***  -0.0017 **  -0.0004   -0.0013   
 (0.0008)    (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0008) 
 Tenure  -0.0001   0.0000   0.0005 ***  0.0001   
 (0.0001)    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 Dividends  -0.0619 ***  -0.0511 **  -0.0634 *  -0.0231   
 (0.0174)    (0.0198) (0.0368) (0.0184) 
 Cash comp  0.0054 *  0.0076 ***  -0.0042   0.0016   
  (0.0027)    (0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0029) 
 Cash  0.0316 ***  0.0330 ***  0.1354 ***  -0.0296 ***  
 (0.0050)    (0.0046) (0.0084) (0.0053) 
 Overconfidence 0.0003 **  0.0004 ***  0.0002   0.0000   
   (0.0001)    (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
 BM  0.0227 ***  0.0201 ***  -0.0344 ***  -0.0140 ***  
 (0.0015)    (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0016) 
 ROA  -0.1028 ***  -0.0986 ***  -0.1691 ***  0.0003   
 (0.0056)    (0.0051) (0.0109) (0.0059) 
 Leverage  0.0264 ***  0.0219 ***  -0.0381 ***  -0.0072 **  
 (0.0028)    (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0029) 
 Stock returns  0.2944 ***  0.2459 ***  0.0130   -0.1004 ***  
 (0.0181)    (0.0170) (0.0329) (0.0191) 
 Sale growth  0.0089 ***  0.0107 ***  0.0116 ***  -0.0005   
 (0.0016)    (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0017) 
 Log of assets  -0.0163 ***  -0.0165 ***  -0.0030 *  -0.0065 ***  
 (0.0009)    (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0009) 
 R2 0.3813  0.3961  0.4455  0.5057  
 N 5207  5189  2975  5207  






Table 6. Duration and Age regression 





t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 2.4558 0.0816 30.08 <.0001 
Age -0.0047 0.0014 -3.34 0.0009 
N 5207  F value 11.14 





Table 7. Interaction terms 
This table reports the OLS regression results with riskiness measures as dependent variables. Dependent 
variables of each regression model are at the top of each result column. The data consists of panel data of 
CEO-year observation on an annual basis. All models include industry (2 digits SIC code) and year fixed 
effects.  All variables are described in appendix A. Intercept not reported. 0.0000 denotes coefficients 
whose absolute values are smaller than 5x105. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  












 Age   -0.0001 *  -0.0007 *** 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 2nd_time_CEO_1    -0.0021   -0.0004 
   (0.0126) (0.0214) 
 Ceo2nd*Duration    0.0051   -0.0043 
   (0.0054) (0.0089) 
 Young  0.0029 0.0100   
 (0.0041) (0.0070)   
 Young*Duration  0.0000   -0.0003   
 (0.0018) (0.0030)   
 Duration  -0.0025 ***  -0.0020   -0.0027 ***  -0.0023 * 
 (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0012) 
 Tenure  -0.0001   0.0003 **  0.0000   0.0005 *** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 Dividends  -0.0620 ***  -0.0672 *  -0.0648 ***  -0.0638 * 
 (0.0174) (0.0368) (0.0174) (0.0368) 
 Cash comp  0.0071 ***  -0.0051   0.0072 ***  -0.0041 
 (0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0026) (0.0047) 
 Cash  0.0311 ***  0.1354 *** 0.0313 ***  0.1354 *** 
 (0.0050) (0.0084) (0.0050) (0.0084) 
 Overconfidence  0.0003 **  0.0002   0.0003 **  0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
 BM  0.0227 ***  -0.0352 *** 0.0226 ***  -0.0348 ***  
 (0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0036) 
 ROA  -0.1020 ***  -0.1690 *** -0.1018 ***  -0.1700 ***  
 (0.0056) (0.0109) (0.0056) (0.0109) 
 Leverage  0.0262 ***  -0.0388 *** 0.0257 ***  -0.0378 ***  
 (0.0028) (0.0054) (0.0028) (0.0054) 
 Stock returns  0.2961 ***  0.0159   0.2936 ***  0.0132   
 (0.0180) (0.0329) (0.0181) (0.0329) 
 Sale growth 0.0088 *** 0.0119 ***  0.0088 ***  0.0115 ***  
 (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0024) 
 Log of assets -0.0163 *** -0.0026 * -0.0164 *** -0.0026 * 
 (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0015) 
 R2 0.3824 0.4448 0.3833 0.4469 
 N 5207 2975 5207 2975  





Table 8. Age group panels 
This table reports the OLS regression results with riskiness measures as dependent variables. Dependent 
variables of each regression model are at the top of each result column. The data consists of panel data of 
CEO-year observation on an annual basis. All models include industry (2 digits SIC code) and year fixed 
effects.  All variables are described in appendix A. Intercept not reported. 0.0000 denotes coefficients 
whose absolute values are smaller than 5x105. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  














 Age  0.0011 * 0.0000   -0.0001   0.0003   -0.0009 **  -0.0012 ***  
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
 Duration  -0.0023   -0.0018 *  -0.0032 ***  0.0007   -0.0018   -0.0045 **  
 (0.0022) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
 Tenure  0.0000   -0.0001   0.0000   0.0005   0.0003   0.0007 ***  
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 Dividends  -0.0803   -0.0431 **  -0.0933 ***  -0.0120   -0.1094 *  -0.0245   
 (0.0847) (0.0204) (0.0314) (0.1296) (0.0572) (0.0479) 
 Cash comp  0.0078   0.0087 **  0.0054   0.0095   0.0002   -0.0169 **  
 (0.0084) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0131) (0.0072) (0.0074) 
 Cash  0.0317 **  0.0338 ***  0.0275 ***  0.1071 ***  0.1587 ***  0.1099 ***  
 (0.0153) (0.0064) (0.0094) (0.0210) (0.0115) (0.0158) 
 Overconfidence  0.0005   0.0000   0.0005 **  -0.0002   0.0002   0.0003   
 (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
 BM  0.0158 ***  0.0233 ***  0.0259 ***  -0.0527 ***  -0.0290 ***  -0.0347 ***  
 (0.0045) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0100) (0.0047) (0.0071) 
 ROA  -0.1011 ***  -0.1089 ***  -0.0893 ***  -0.1708 ***  -0.1408 ***  -0.2281 ***  
 (0.0143) (0.0077) (0.0109) (0.0273) (0.0143) (0.0225) 
 Leverage  0.0086   0.0293 ***  0.0329 ***  -0.1025 ***  -0.0281 ***  -0.0201 *  
 (0.0083) (0.0035) (0.0056) (0.0149) (0.0071) (0.0103) 
 Stock_ returns  0.2014 ***  0.3262 ***  0.3063 ***  0.0172   -0.0142   0.0518   
 (0.0464) (0.0235) (0.0368) (0.0784) (0.0435) (0.0673) 
 Sale growth  0.0242 ***  0.0038 **  0.0152 ***  0.0496 ***  0.0073 **  0.0109 **  
 (0.0063) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0087) (0.0028) (0.0045) 
 Log assets -0.0148 *** -0.0165 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0068  -0.0014  -0.0028  
 (0.0030) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0045) (0.0021) (0.0028) 
 R2 0.2926  0.4520  0.4174  0.5814  0.4235  0.4982  
 N 836  2874  1497  538  1620  817  





Table 9. M&A analysis  
This table reports the regression results with M&A related characteristics as dependent variables. 
Dependent variables of each regression model are at the top of each result column. The data consists of 
panel data of CEO-year observation on an annual basis. Panel A presents an OLS regression while Panel B 
present results from logistic regressions with denoted dependent variables. Model 1 includes industry (2 
digits SIC code) and year fixed effects.  All variables are described in appendix A.. The fitness measure for 
logistic regression are t-jur pseudo R2. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 Panel A:  
OLS regression 
Panel B:  
Logistic regressions 
 Relative deal size 
(1) 
Diff 2 digit SIC 
(2) 




 Age 0.0000 0.0244 0.0112 -0.0784 *** 
  (0.0044) (0.0264) (0.0265)  (0.0298) 
 Duration -0.0188 0.1825 -0.1444 -0.2968 
  (0.0366) (0.2300) (0.2593) (0.2441) 
 Tenure -0.0004 -0.0075 0.0002 0.1098 *** 
   (0.0040) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0276) 
 Dividends -4.1800 ** 38.4443 *** 26.4923 ** 23.1959 ** 
  (2.0309) (9.8034) (10.8683) (9.8089) 
 Current comp 0.3941 ** 0.2951 2.2477 ** -1.5260 * 
 (0.1616) (0.8207) (0.9139) (0.8968) 
 Cash 0.1231 -1.4629 -4.1400 ** -9.8927 *** 
  (0.3303) (1.8742) (1.8086) (2.7353) 
 Overconfidence 0.0082 0.0161 0.0037 -0.0258 
  (0.0076) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0436) 
 BM 0.2611 ** 0.3660 0.2872 1.0250 
  (0.1055) (0.6805) (0.6402) (0.7011) 
 ROA -0.7358 12.7829 *** 9.2699 *** 7.1903 ** 
  (0.4511) (3.5676) (3.1321) (3.6438) 
 Leverage 1.0386 *** 2.0534 ** 0.2362 0.9495 
  (0.1678) (0.9330) (0.8895) (0.9524) 
 Stock returns 0.7077 0.1902 6.9681 7.4245 
  (0.9934) (5.9644) (5.8102) (6.3279) 
 Sale growth 0.1889 ** -0.6824 -0.4809 1.9207 ** 
  (0.0785) (0.5328) (0.5369) (0.8131) 
 Log of assets 0.0036 -0.5400 ** -0.1127 -0.0087 
  (0.0430) (0.2189) (0.2257) (0.2196) 
 R2 0.3536 0.0767 0.0872 0.2197 
 N 277 277 277 277 
 Fixed effects IndxYear No  No  No  
 
